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INTRODUCTION

In 1989 the Texas Legislature repealed the former workers' com* B.A., LL.B., Louisiana State University; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University. A.W.
Walker Centennial Chair, University of Texas School of Law.
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pensation law' and replaced it with the new Texas Workers' Compensation Act.2 The new Act took effect on January 1, 1991. 3 On the
matters explored in this Article, the new Act probably makes no
changes. The provisions of both the old and new laws are identified in
footnotes. When it is debatable whether the new Act makes a change,
the relevant language of the old and new statutes is set forth and
compared.
The focus of this Article is tort suits by employees or their families
based on personal injury or death occurring in the course and scope of
the workers' employment. If an injury does not occur in the course
and scope of the employment, the defendant's status as employer becomes irrelevant;4 the lawsuit is simply a common-law tort action,
and the defendant has all of the common-law defenses.
II.

TORT LITIGATION BY EMPLOYEES AGAINST
NONSUBSCRIBING EMPLOYERS

Most states require most industrial employers to obtain workers'
compensation coverage. The trade-off is that an employer who is covered by the workers' compensation system is generally immune from
tort liability to its workers for injuries sustained in the course and
scope of the workers' employment.
In Texas, however, workers' compensation coverage is essentially
1. Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 271, repealedby
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10.
3. Remember that the constitutionality of the new Act is under attack. A leading practice guide cautions as follows:
The constitutionality of the 1989 Texas Workers' Compensation Act is under review by
the San Antonio Court of Appeals. An initial ruling in Garcia v. Eagle PassAuto Electric,
Inc., Cause No. 90-11-10301-CV in the 365th District Court of Maverick County, Texas,
has found that the Act uses "arbitrary and unreasonable" impairment standards and limits workers' access to the courts. Until a final, unappealable judgment is rendered in this
judicial challenge, practitioners are advised to exercise extreme caution in determining
what law governs an occupational injury in the state.
1 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 5

(Supp. 1993).
4. See Ellison v. Trailite, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, no writ) (holding that injury on employer's premises to employee who had just been fired
and was waiting for her severance check was outside course of employment and therefore
subject to normal tort law).
5. 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION

LAW § 62.02(l)(c), (3)(d) (1992).
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voluntary for the employer.6 The new and old statutes are alike in
providing that a nonsubscribing employer is subject to negligence liability to injured employees and to the legal beneficiaries of fatally injured employees. The employer is these cases is precluded from
invoking the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and the fellow servant rule.7 Aside from the loss of these
defenses, "no other penalty is imposed by law on an employer for
electing not to carry workers' compensation insurance.""
A.

The Plaintiffs Case in Chief

When a worker sustains injury in the course and scope of her employment, she can sue the nonsubscribing employer in tort. There are
no doctrinal differences from general tort litigation. Plaintiffs in such
cases have often prevailed by showing that the injuries proximately
resulted from the employer's failure to use reasonable care in (1) providing a safe work place, (2) supplying an adequate number of workers to conduct the work safely, (3) selecting careful and competent
6. In theory employees can also opt out of the workers' compensation system. See TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.08 (Vernon Supp. 1993). An opt-out employee has a tort
action against the employer in which the normal defenses obtain. Id. I have found no reported case involving an employee who opted out of the system. The predecessor provision
was Article 8306, Section 3a. Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen.
Laws 271, repealed by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10 (Vernon
Supp. 1993).
7. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1993). Article 8308-3.03
states:
(a) In an action against an employer who does not have workers' compensation insurance
coverage to recover damages for personal injuries or death sustained by an employee in
the course and scope of the employment, it is not a defense that: (1)the employee was
guilty of contributory-negligence; (2) the employee assumed the risk of injury or death; or
(3) the injury or death was caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.
(b) This section does not reinstate or otherwise affect the availability of these or other
defenses at common law.
(c) The employer may defend the action on the ground that the injury was caused by an
intentional act of the employee to bring about the injury or while the employee was in a
state of intoxication.
Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.04 (Vernon Supp. 1993) provides: "In all such
actions against an employer who does not have workers' compensation insurance coverage, it
is necessary to a recovery for the plaintiff to prove negligence of the employer or some agent or
servant of the employer acting within the general scope of his employment." Id. Functionally
identical provisions appeared in the previous law as Article 8306, Sections 1 and 4. Act of
March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 270-71, repealed by TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
8. Gary Thornton, Litigation Involving Non-Subscribers to Workers' Compensation Insurance, 54 TEX. B.J. 318, 318 (1991).
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workers, (4) furnishing and maintaining reasonably safe appliances,
(5) instructing workers on safety procedures, or (6) posting safety
rules. 9 Other recent decisions suggest that on an appropriate showing
a nonsubscribing employer ° may be held liable for the intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress," sexual harassment,1 2 and
3
perhaps for invasion of privacy. 1
9. Gary Thornton, LitigationInvolving Non-Subscribersto Workers' Compensation Insurance, 54 TEX. B.J. 318, 318-20 (1991).
10. None of the opinions discussed in notes 11-13 explicitly indicate that the defendant
employer was a nonsubscriber to the workers' compensation system. But subscribing employers are liable to nonfatally-injured employees only when intentional misconduct or injury is
proved. In the cases discussed in notes 11-13 the courts gave no indication of concern for the
intent requirement; one must therefore assume that the defendants in such cases are nonsubscribers. But cf. Mitchell v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 722 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1986, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding that employee can sue subscribing employer for violation of federal legislation prohibiting sexual harassment and sex discrimination and thereafter
seek state workers' compensation benefits).
11. Diamond Shamrock v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 201-02 (Tex. 1992). In Diamond
Shamrock, a worker fired for theft sued his former employer for, inter alia, the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 198. The Texas Supreme Court's discussion of that tort
theory began by quoting Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which addresses
recovery for the intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress through extreme
and outrageous conduct. Id. at 201. The supreme court then stated:
We have never recognized this tort, but a number of Texas courts of appeals have done so
(citations omitted), as have courts in many other jurisdictions. We need not decide in this
case whether the tort exists in Texas, because Mendez failed to offer more than a scintilla
of evidence of an essential element of the tort . . . , the presence of outrageous conduct.
Id. at 201-02. Three justices dissented, arguing that the emotional distress tort is well recognized and that the Diamond Shamrock employer's theft charges amounted to outrageous conduct. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 203, 212, 213. The plaintiff in Dean v. FordMotor
Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989), recovered for the employer's intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress on showing that a supervisory employee put checks in
her purse in order to make it appear that she was a thief. In Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652,
659 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991), the court
upheld an award of damages for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress in a
sexual harassment context. Id.
12. Bushell, 781 S.W.2d at 654. In addition to her emotional distress claim, the Bushell
plaintiff separately claimed for sexual harassment pursuant to Article 522 1K, Section 5.01 of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated. Id. The court of appeals reversed the plaintiffs
award under that claim on evidentiary grounds and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 654-57,
659. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court for
further consideration. Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991).
13. The four traditional categories of tortious invasion of privacy are: (1) intrusion into
the victim's seclusion; (2) publicizing embarrassing private facts; (3) appropriating the victim's
name or likeness for commercial purposes; and (4) portraying the victim in a false light. W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
The opinion in Diamond Shamrock states that it is an open question whether Texas recognizes
the "false light" invasion of privacy theory, but suggests the other three headings of the pri-
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B. Affirmative Defenses
The nonsubscribing employer can defend against the employee's
tort suit on the basis that the injuries were intentionally self-inflicted
or were the result of the employee's intoxication. 4 As indicated
above, however, the assumed risk, contributory negligence, and fellow
servant defenses are statutorily abolished."5 The loss of these defenses
is seen as a penalty for nonsubscription.
The penalty is significant. Although the nonsubscribing employer's
inability to invoke the assumed risk defense no longer has any meaning-because assumed risk has been absorbed by the law of comparative fault' 6-stripping the nonsubscribing employer of the fellow
servant defense increases the employer's exposure to an extent. And,
the loss of the contributory negligence defense is quite a serious consequence of an employer's nonsubscription to the workers' compensation system. The unavailability of the contributory negligence defense
means that an employer whose fault, however slight, was a proximate
cause of the injuries will owe full damages, notwithstanding any perception that the injured employee was also at fault in a way that was a
proximate cause of the injuries. Theoretically the employer will owe
full damages even when the facts suggest that the employer's fault was
as little as 1% of the total causative fault and that the injured employee's fault was as much as 99% of the total causative fault.' 7
vacy tort are recognized. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 200. The supreme court found it
unnecessary to decide whether the "false-light" theory is valid because it concluded that in any
event the plaintiff had failed to prove an essential element of that tort, "actual malice" (defined
as knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity and the false light in which the victim would be

placed). Id. at 200-01. Three justices dissented, arguing that prior decisions recognize all four
of the privacy theories and that defendant had waived its right to rely on any "actual-malice"

requirement. Id. at 207, 212-216, 219-20.
14. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The predecessor
provision provided for the same effect. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § I (Vernon
1967).
15. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
16. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975). Farley abolished as-

sumed risk except for strict liability actions. Id. As amended in 1987, the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code sets up a "comparative responsibility" defense for both negligence and

strict liability cases. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
The defense is defined to include victim conduct "causing or contributing to cause [the injury]
in any way, whether by negligent act or omission, . . . [or] by other conduct or activity violative
of the applicable legal standard...,." Id. at § 33.011(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
17. Cf. Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1988, no writ) (deceased employee's 65% fault did not affect plaintiff's right to full recovery in
action for exemplary damages based on death of employee).
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Several writers have argued that, despite the statutory abolition of
the contributory negligence defense, the nonsubscribing employer can
nevertheless sometimes invoke the victim's fault as a basis for defeating liability. These writers assert that such an employer can avoid
liability "by showing that the employee's own negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the injury.""8 Their argument seems unsound.
Saying that the employee's fault was the "sole proximate cause" of
the harm may occassionally be a left-handed way of saying the defendant was not guilty of any negligent conduct, or that on general
principles applicable to the proximate cause issue any negligent conduct on the defendant's part was not a proximate cause of the injuries.
When "sole proximate cause" is used in that way it is merely awkward phrasing, and there is no particularly objection to it.
But the "sole proximate cause" argument under discussion purports to be much more than a reminder of normal proximate cause
principles. The writers referenced above contend that the victim's
negligence can sometimes be such, in and of itself, as to keep the defendant's negligent conduct from being regarded as a proximate cause
of the injuries. In that guise the "sole proximate cause" argument is
pernicious. Allowing a defendant whose negligent conduct has been
shown to be a proximate cause of the harm to escape liability by
pointing to the victim's fault as "sole proximate cause" would amount
to smuggling the abolished contributory negligence defense into these
cases through the back door. This "sole proximate cause" fallacy has
been widely debunked in the general comparative fault literature. 19
The Texas decisions sometimes cited in support of the "sole proximate cause" argument contain some suggestive language but in fact
18. 3

L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKER'S COMPENSA§ 62.02(3)(a) (1992). Gary Thornton, Litigation Involving Non-Subscribers to
Workers' Compensation Insurance, 54 TEX. B.J. 318, 322 (1991). "While the defense of contributory-negligence is unavailable ... , nevertheless, negligence of the injured worker which is
the sole proximate cause of his injuries defeats his recovery." Id.
19. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 379-80
(1989) (relating "sole proximate cause" to contributory negligence bar to recovery); VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 4.4 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that this interpretation
assigns broader meaning to "proximate cause" than in other contexts and defeats the purpose
of comparative negligence system); see also DAVID W. ROBERTSON, THE LOUISIANA LAW OF
TION

HOWARD

LAW

COMPARATIVE FAULT:

A

DECADE OF PROGRESS

22-28 (1991) (discussing effect of "sole

proximate cause" on recovery); David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault,
Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1341, 1341-43 (1984) (arguing that victim's fault
should not entirely remove him from scope of protection).
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do not allow any such "sole proximate cause" defense.2" Clearly the
intended meaning of the statutory abolition of the contributory negligence defense is that the victim's fault neither defeats nor diminishes
recovery. One should not be able to avoid this effect by changing the
name of the victim-fault defense from "contributory negligence" to
"sole proximate cause."
III.

SUBSCRIBING EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR
INTENTIONAL HARM

The subscribing employer's liability for workers' compensation
benefits is said to be "the exclusive remedy of an employee or legal
beneficiary against the employer or an agent, servant, or employee of
the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by a
covered employee."' 2' However, liability for intentional injury is a
long-standing exception.
The intentional injury exception is not spelled out in the workers'
compensation statutes; it is based on constitutional reasoning. When
the constitutionality of the original 1913 Texas workers' compensation statute was challenged in the Texas Supreme Court, the court
held that the statute could not constitutionally abrogate an injured
employee's cause of action in tort for intentional harm:
Notwithstanding the breadth of some of [the statute's] terms, its evident
purpose was to confine its operation to only accidental injuries, and its
scope is to be so limited .... The Bill of Rights, Section 13, Article I of

the Constitution provides that "every person for an injury done him, in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course

of law." . . . It is therefore not to be doubted that the Legislature is

without the power to deny the citizen the right to resort to the courts
for the redress of any intentional injury to his person by another. Such
a cause of action may be said to be protected by the Constitution and

could not be taken away .... This Act does not affect the right of re-

dress for that class of wrongs. The injuries, or wrongs, with which it
20. E.g., Najera v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 207 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. 1948); Turner
v. Lone Star Indus. Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Farm Products Co. v. Stock, 657 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
21. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The functionally identical provision in the former statute was Article 8306, Section 3. Act of March 28,
1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 271, repealed by TEX. REV, CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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deals are accidental injuries or wrongs."

Since that time, the existence of the injured employee's cause of action
for "intentional injury" has been unquestioned.23
A.

The Meaning of Intent

According to a new national workers' compensation casebook,
"[e]ither by express statutory provision or judicial construction, every
state allows employees to sue their employers in tort for intended injuries."" The decisions nationwide reflect three views of the meaning
of the intent requirement in this context. The strictest view requires
the plaintiff to show that the defendant-employer subjectively desired
to injure the employee. 25 A second view allows recovery when the
defendant-employer either subjectively desired the consequences of its
conduct or knew to a substantial certainty that such consequences
would ensue.26 A third view would find "intent" when the employer
committed an intentional act that created a highly unreasonable risk
of harm.27
Texas falls into the second group. 28 The leading case in Texas is
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin.29 In Copelin, the worker was hurt by a

dangerous workplace machine that had been made still more dangerous by the employer's modifications. Notwithstanding a strong showing by the plaintiff that the employer knew that using the machinenicknamed "jaws" 3 o-was extremely risky, the Texas Supreme Court

upheld summary judgment for the defendant and stated: "[T]he intentional failure to furnish a safe place to work does not rise to the
level of intentional injury except when the employer believes his conduct is substantially certain to cause the injury."'" The same view22. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 108-08, 185 S.W. 556, 560
(1916), af'd, 249 U.S. 152 (1919).
23. See Howard Nations & James B. Bennett, Recovery of Exemplary Damages Under the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 431, 432 (1978) (stating that all common
law rights are retained when injury is intentional).

24.

JOSEPH W. LITrLE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES AND MATERIALS

430

(3d ed. 1993).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 428-29.
28. See generally David C. Goldberg, Note, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 513 (1986).

29. 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
30. Id. at 408.
31. Id. at 407.
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point-that neither highly aggravated negligence nor recklessness
rises [or sinks?] to the level of intent-is reflected by the supreme
court's holding in Castleberry v. Goolsby Building Corp.32 that an allegation of "gross, wanton, and willful negligence" does not allege an
intentional injury.33 The cases make clear that the requisite desire or
substantially certain knowledge must be attributable to a relatively
high-ranking official or supervisory employee; it is not enough for the
plaintiff to show that she was battered or otherwise intentionally
harmed by a fellow employee.34
With the supreme court's 1989 decision in Rodriguez v. Naylor Industries,35 the rule permitting recovery in tort when the employer
knew to a substantial certainty that its conduct would produce injury36 arguably gained new vitality. Over the employee's protest, the
employer in Rodriguez insisted that the employee drive a truck with
defective tires. 37 Even after one blowout, the employer continued to
insist.38 Soon a second blowout overturned the truck and injured the
worker. 39 Reversing the lower courts' award of summary judgment to
the employer, the unanimous supreme court held that a triable issue
of fact existed on the element of knowledge to a substantial certainty. 4° A court of appeals recently reached a similar conclusion in
Kielwin v. Gulf Nuclear, Inc.4 The court reversed a summary judgment for defendant and remanded the case for trial on the issue of
whether the defendant knew to a substantial certainty that radioactive
contamination of the employee would result from the employer's
conduct.
In both Rodriguez and Kielwin the defendants testified that they did
32. 617 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1981).
33. Castleberry, 617 S.W.2d at 666.
34. E.g., Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied).
35. 763 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1989).

36. Cf Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co., 670 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (stating that employer's knowledge that assault was substantially certain
to occur justified holding employer liable for intending battery). This version of the "transferred intent" doctrine is consistent with mainstream intentional tort thinking. But the
supreme court later indicated, somewhat ambiguously, that "Bennight is limited to its facts."
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1985).

37. Rodriguez, 763 S.W.2d at 412.
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 413.
41. 783 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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not "believe" that injury was substantially certain to follow from their
conduct and tried to argue that such testimony should be conclusive
on the issue of belief. The courts rejected this argument on the implicit view that the issue is the somewhat objective issue of knowledge
rather than the purely subjective issue of belief. As the supreme court
stated in Rodriguez, "[tihere are a number of ways to establish...
intent other than asking the employer how 42he felt about an injury
causing event after it has already occurred.
B.

Affirmative Defenses

Treatment of the affirmative defenses available to an employer sued
for intentionally causing a workplace injury is largely a matter of
speculation. I have found no cases shedding light on the matter. The
lack of reported cases is probably explained by the stringency of the
intent requirement, which keeps virtually all cases from proceeding to
a point at which affirmative defenses need to be addressed.
In the general tort law neither assumption of risk nor contributory
negligence is a defense to intentional tort liability.43 There is no reason why intentional tort litigation against employers should be
different.
Respecting the fellow servant defense," there seems to be no clear
doctrinal barrier to prevent its use in intentional injury cases. But it is
difficult to conceive of a case in which a plaintiff could satisfy the
intent requirement and still run afoul of a fellow servant argument.
As indicated above, the Workers' Compensation Act provides that
a worker's intentional self-injury and intoxication are defenses available to a nonsubscribing employer. 45 These defenses should probably
not apply against either a subscribing or a nonsubscribing employer
when intent can be shown. For example, if the Rodriguez plaintiff

42. Rodriguez, 763 S.W.2d at 413.
43. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.002(a), 33.011(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
44. Funk Farms, Inc. v. Montoya, 736 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The fellow servant doctrine provides that an employer will not generally be liable in tort for injuries suffered by one employee that were proximately caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant. Fellow servants are defined as "those workers who serve the
same master, work under the same control, derive their authority and compensation from the
same common source, and engage in the same general business." Id. (citing H. & T.C. Railway Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267, 269 (1884)).
45. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at

575 & n.69 (5th ed. 1984).
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could have proved intent-that is, if the plaintiff could have demonstrated that the employer knew to a virtual certainty that the tires
were so defective that a dangerous wreck was bound to happen-any

showing of the driver's intoxication should probably neither have defeated nor diminished the plaintiff's recovery.46 In general intentional
tort law, one cannot escape liability by arguing that the victim was
drunk. There is no apparent reason to apply a differing approach
here.4 7

This leaves for consideration the general-law defenses to intentional
tort liability: consent and the privileges pertaining to defense of person and defense of property. These defenses will presumably apply in

intentional tort litigation against employers. As indicated above, I
have found no case in which any of these defenses came into play.
IV.

THE SUBSCRIBING EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES WHEN GROSS NEGLIGENCE FATALLY INJURES
48
AN EMPLOYEE

The Texas Constitution provides that "[e]very person, corporation,
or company, that may commit a homicide, through wilful act, or

omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or
such of them as there may be ....

The new Texas Workers' Compensation Act implements the application of that constitutional provision against subscribing employers
by providing in Article 8308-4.01(b) that:
[The exclusive remedy provision] does not prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages by the surviving spouse or heirs of the body of a de-

ceased employee whose death was caused by an intentional act or
omission of the employer or by the employer's gross negligence. For
46. Rodriguez v. Naylor Indust., 763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1989).
47. Intoxication and intentional self-injury should not be affirmative defenses. But when
an injury was caused by the worker's conduct in either respect, the employer may sometimes
be able to use that fact to show that its alleged intentional conduct was not a cause-in-fact of
the injuries. Compare the text accompanying notes 18-20. Gary Thornton, Litigation Involving Non-Subscribers to Workers' Compensation Insurance, 54 TEX. B.J. 318, 322 (1991).
48. When considering exemplary damages in any context nowadays one must contend
with the potential due process limits on state law that emanate from Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, - U.S. -, Ill S. Ct. 1032, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991). For a clear
explanation of the meaning of Haslip, see Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377,
1380-86 (5th Cir. 1991) (reviewing Mississippi punitive damages award).
49. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 26.
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the purposes of this section, "gross negligence" has the meaning assigned to it by Section 41.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.50
The referenced Civil Practice and Remedies Code definition of "gross
negligence" is as follows: "'Gross negligence' means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It
means such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights,
51
safety, or welfare of the person affected."
The previous workers' compensation statute contained no definition
of gross negligence. Otherwise, it was functionally identical to the
new Act.

A.

52

The Groundsfor Liability: "Gross Negligence"

The plaintiff must show that the fatal injuries were "caused by an
intentional act or omission of the employer or by the employer's gross
negligence. ' 53 "Intentional act" in this context presumably has the
meaning discussed above in Section II. The meaning of "gross negligence" remains to be explored. "Most exemplary damages claims [in
54
these death cases] have involved allegations of gross negligence."
The new statutory definition of gross negligence5 5 probably does
not change the law. The leading cases on this point under the previous workers' compensation law were the supreme court's decisions in
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls5 6 and Williams v. Steves Industries. In
50. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
51. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
52. The previous workers' compensation provision stated:
Nothing in this law shall be taken or held to prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages
by the surviving husband, wife, heirs of his or her body, or such of them as there may be
of any deceased employ6 whose death is occasioned by homicide from the wilful act or
omission or gross negligence of any person, firm or corporation from the employer of such
employ6 at the time of the injury causing the death of the latter. In any suit so brought
for exemplary damages, the trial shall be de novo, and no presumption shall exist that any
award, ruling or finding of the Industrial Accident Board was correct. In any such suit,

such award, ruling or finding shall neither be pleaded nor offered in evidence.
Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen Laws 271, repealed by TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 to 8308-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
53. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
54. 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, § 61.04(1)(a), at 61-18 (Supp. 1992).
55. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
56. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).

57. 699 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985). Williams was an action for exemplary damages in a
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Burk, the supreme court affirmed an award of exemplary damages
when the employer's fault resulted in a worker's death in an oil well
fire. "Gross negligence" was defined as "such an entire want of care
as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of
conscious indifference" to the worker's safety.58 After laying down
that definition, the court reviewed the jury's finding of gross negligence in such a way as to indicate that "entire want of care" is not to
be taken literally; the ultimate question is whether under all of the
circumstances a conclusion of conscious indifference is indicated. The
court stated, "In other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that
he didn't care." 5 9 Four years later in Williams, the court reiterated
the Burk definition 6° and stated that the emphasis should be on "the
'conscious indifference' component. ' 6 1
The new statutory definition seems functionally identical. In a recent court of appeals decision affirming an award of exemplary damages against an employer, the court explicitly held that the Burk and
Williams definition of "gross negligence" is identical to the new definition in Section 41.001(5) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.6 2
Thus, the key question remains whether the total circumstances show
the defendant's "conscious indifference" to the victim's safety.63
context other than workplace injuries. Id. at 571. But exemplary damages are never available
unless gross negligence--or worse-can be shown, and the court's discussion of the definition
of gross negligence can be regarded as fully pertinent to the workplace fatality exemplary
damages cause of action.
58. Burk, 616 S.W.2d at 920.
59. Id. at 922.
60. Williams, 699 S.W.2d at 572.
61. Id. at 573.
62. Beverly Enters. of Tex., Inc. v. Leath, 829 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992,
n.w.h.). Leath was an action by a living employee against a nonsubscribing employer. Id. at
385. But the "gross negligence" reasoning is fully applicable in the fatal injury or exemplary
damages context.
63. "Conscious indifference" is a subjective mental state. But "inasmuch as the defendant
is unlikely to confess subjective blameworthiness, the plaintiff must be allowed to prove subjective fault by reference to [the] defendant's behavior ..
" DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 354 (1989). In other words, if the circumstances are such
that anyone in defendant's shoes is bound consciously to have realized that an unacceptable
risk was being created, conscious indifference can be inferred, despite the defendant's strenuous disavowal. The controversial "conscious indifference" language in Williams was meant
probably to indicate only that truism: "[A] plaintiff may objectively prove a defendant's gross
negligence by proving that under the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person would
have realized that his conduct created an extreme degree of risk to the safety of others." Williams, 699 S.W.2d at 573. The quoted language, which is repeated in Clifton Y.Southern Pa-
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It should be noted in passing that what Texas law is calling "gross
negligence" would be called "recklessness" in most states. In mainstream thinking, gross negligence is highly risky behavior in which
the "subjective" element of conscious indifference is not shown; when
that subjective element is shown, the conduct is generally called
"recklessness."" In effect, Texas has defined "gross negligence" to
mean recklessness.65
B.

Showing Actual Damages

"Under Texas law, exemplary damages are generally not recoverable in the absence of proof that the plaintiff has sustained actual loss
or injury."' 66 Using that general view, the supreme court in the 1934
decision Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell 67 held that plaintiffs in
these fatal-injury-to-employee cases had to allege, prove, and secure
jury findings on the existence and amount of actual damages in order
68
to recover the exemplary damages contemplated by the statute.
In 1987, the Texas Supreme Court made a major change. Wright v.
Gifford-Hill & Co.6 9 did away with the required finding of the amount
of actual damages. 70 The supreme court explained:
The plaintiff in a workers' compensation case cannot recover actual
damages. Consequently, the questions of ordinary negligence and actual damages are not involved in an action to recover exemplary damages for the death of an employee covered by workers' compensation
insurance. Therefore, it is a waste of the jury's time and efforts to recific TransportationCo., could also be taken to mean that a defendant who does not harbor the
subjectively blameworthy "conscious indifference" mental state might be liable on a showing
that a reasonable person would have harbored that mental state. Clifton v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 709 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. 1986). The Civil Practice and Remedies Code put to
rest the latter interpretation of Williams and Clifton by redefining gross negligence as actual

"conscious indifference." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.01(b); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993); see John Montford & Will Barber, 1987
Texas Tort Reform: The Questfor a Fairerand More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System,

Part Two, 25 Hous. L. REV. 245, 317-23 (1988) (explaining controversy and detailing legisla-

tive history).
64. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 354-55 (1989).

65. Williams, 699 S.W.2d at 573. "The Texas definition is a hybrid definition, distinctive
to this state and unusual by comparison to the law of other states." Id.
66. 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 61.02(3)(a) at 61-15 (1992).
67. 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
68. Fort Worth Elevators Co., 133 Tex. at 150, 70 S.W.2d at 409.
69. 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987).
70. Wright, 725 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1987).
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quire a finding of an amount of actual damages in such a case. In the
interest of judicial economy, we disapprove that portion of Fort Worth
Elevators which states that a plaintiff must secure a jury finding as to
the amount of actual damages in a wrongful death cases arising under
[this provision of the workmen's compensation statute].
After introducing evidence of [the existence of] actual damage and
securing jury findings that the gross negligence of Gifford-Hill proximately caused the death of her husband, Mrs. Wright would have been
entitled to recover actual damages but for the Workers' Compensation
Act. The plaintiff need not secure a finding on the amount of actual
damages in order to recover exemplary damages.
71
C.

Limiting the Amount of Exemplary Damages

The Civil Practice and Remedies Code sets a general ceiling on exemplary damages-the greater of $200,000 or four times the actual
damages. 72 But this limitation is explicitly made inapplicable to "an
action to recover exemplary damages against an employer by the employee's beneficiaries in a death action arising out of the course and
scope of employment where the employer is a subscriber under the
workers' compensation laws of this state."' 73 The only limits are
therefore general standards of reasonableness, looking to such factors
as "(1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned; and (5) the extent to
which such conduct offends the public sense of justice and propriety."' 74 It is important to note that one traditional aid in controlling
the amount of an exemplary damages award-looking to the ratio of
exemplary damages to actual damages-is no longer available in these
cases under the holding in Wright.
D.

Who Can Sue?
The exemplary damages action is confined to the deceased em71. Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
72. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN.

§ 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1993).

73. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Note
that the ceiling on exemplary damages is applicable in litigation against nonsubscribing employers. E.g., Beverly Enters. of Tex., Inc. v. Leath, 829 S.W.2d 382, 387-88 (Tex. App.Waco 1992, no writ).

74. 3
TION LAW

L. NATIONS
§ 61.10 (1992).

HOWARD

& JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSA-
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ployee's spouse and "heirs of the body." It seems settled that the
term "heirs of the body" includes only natural children. Parents and
siblings are not included,"' and neither, presumably, are grandchildren or adoptive children.
E. Affirmative Defenses
The Civil Practice and Remedies Code merges the defenses of assumed risk and contributory negligence into a single "comparative
responsibility" defense.76 The Code further provides that the comparative responsibility defense is not applicable in "actions against an employer for exemplary damages arising out of the death of an
employee."' 77 Thus the only affirmative defense available in these fatal
injury exemplary damages cases is the fellow servant doctrine.
In its heyday, the fellow servant doctrine provided that an employer could not be liable to a worker injured by the negligence of a
fellow worker.78 Today the defense is considerably more limited. It
does not apply when the injury-producing fault was that of a supervisory employee. 79 The defense is also unavailable when the injury-producing fault constitutes the breach of a so-called "nondelegable" duty
of the employer.8 " Employers' recognized nondelegable duties include promulgating safety rules and regulations, warning employees
of workplace hazards, furnishing reasonably safe machinery and instrumentalities, providing a reasonably safe place to work, and selecting and training competent fellow workers.81

75. See 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 61.02.
76. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The Texas

Civil Practice & Remedies Code defines comparative responsibility to include victim conduct
"1causing or contributing to cause [the injury] in any way, whether by negligent act or omission, [or] by other conduct or activity violative of the applicable legal standard." Id.
77. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
78. See generally 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS'

COMPENSATION LAW § 61.06(3)(b) (1992) (defining fellow servant doctrine).
79. See, e.g., Funk Farms, Inc. v. Montoya, 736 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding master responsible for negligent acts of employees with
vice-principal status).
80. See, e.g., Missouri Valley, Inc. v. Putman, 627 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1982, no writ) (providing safety rules is nondelegable duty of master).
81. 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 61.07(3) (1992).
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V.
A.

ELECTION-OF-REMEDIES CONSIDERATIONS

The Action for IntentionalHarm

"An injured employee's acceptance of compensation benefits under
the [Workers' Compensation] Act for nonfatal injuries inflicted by an
intentional act constitutes an election of remedies and precludes the
employee from bringing a subsequent cause of action against the employer seeking actual and exemplary damages based on the commission of an intentional tort."'8 2 Until very recently the decisions on this
point have all indicated that the binding election occurs when the employee claims, receives, or accepts compensation benefits.8 3 The theory has been that the two remedies-workers' compensation for
accidental injury and tort damages for intentional injury-are mutually exclusive, such that a worker's choice of the accidental-injury
route should estop her from later pursuing the inconsistent intentional
injury route.8 4 A recent decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals may
signal the beginnings of a change in thinking. 5 In Ramirez v. Pecan
Deluxe Candy Co.,86 the court of appeals determined that a binding
election does not occur until the worker has made a knowing choice to
forgo the intentional injury remedy, and that such a knowing choice
might not occur until there has been a "final settlement" of the case
seeking workers' compensation benefits.8 7
The election of remedies theory would presumably work in reverse
and mean that a worker who sues for intentional tort damages is
thereby precluded from seeking workers' compensation benefits for
that injury. I have no cases directly on point.8 8 The election of remedies theory is not powerful enough to prevent the spouse of a worker
who has accepted compensation from suing the employer in inten82. 3

L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSA§ 61.01(3)(c).
83. E.g., Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983); Reed Tool Co. v.
Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1980), appeal after remand, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
84. 3 HOWARD L. NATIONS & JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 61.01(3)(c), at 61-10. The theory of mutual exclusivity thus goes back to the
Middleton notion that "accidental" and "intentional" are mutually exclusive concepts.
85. Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co., 839 S.W.2d 101, 106-07 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, writ denied).
86. 839 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
87. Id. at 106-07.
88. But c.f. Mitchell v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 722 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that employee's filing and then compromising federal sex discrimination claim does not preclude pursuing state compensation remedy).
HOWARD

TION LAW
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tional tort and seeking damages for lost consortium. The cases allow
intentional tort actions by spouses of those workers who have sought
or accepted compensation, reasoning that the action for loss of consortium, sometimes thought of as derivative, is the spouse's separate
property.8 9 Almost all of the cases seeking intentional tort damages
against subscribing employers seem to be brought by workers'
spouses. 90 Because the intentional injury remedy is seldom successful,
counsel for injured workers probably feel bound in virtually all cases
to advise the workers to seek compensation and thus forgo the intentional remedy. The potential availability of the intentional injury
remedy to a worker's spouse is presumably an occasional consolation
inthese cases.
B.

The Action for Exemplary Damagesfor Gross Negligence
Resulting in Death

The statute and the cases contemplate that the exemplary damages
action will lie although workers' compensation benefits have been
sought or paid. There is no election of remedies problem.
C.

Other Contexts

In several contexts a worker can pursue or receive compensation
benefits and thereafter seek tort damages without running afoul of an
election of remedies doctrine. For example, after unsuccessfully pursuing workers' compensation benefits a worker can sue the employer
on the theory that the injuries did not occur in the course and scope of
the employment. 9 ' Similarly, receiving workers' compensation benefits does not preclude a tort suit asserting that the employer failed to
comply with the notice provisions of the Act and thus should be liable
in tort as a nonsubscribing employer. 92

89. See Reed, 689 S.W.2d at 405 (describing action by spouse for loss of consortium).
90. Eg., Rodriguez v. Naylor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1989); Reed Tool, 689
S.W.2d 404; Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co., 670 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Austin,
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. E.g., Wasson v. Stracener, 786 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ
denied).
92. E.g., Ferguson v. Hosp. Corp. Int'l, 769 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1985).
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POTENTIAL AREAS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY NOT
EXPLORED HERE

Decisions in other states have held that employers covered by
workers' compensation may nevertheless be liable for fraudulently
concealing workers' employment-related illnesses or injuries;9 3 for vi-

olating federal and state civil-rights statutes addressing sex, age, and
race discrimination;94 and for discriminating against handicapped
workers.95 None of these areas of potential liability has been explored
in this paper.
In some states an employer covered by the workers' compensation
system may nonetheless be liable in tort for certain types of injuries
96
that are not compensable under the workers' compensation statute.
Texas cases indicate that this theory of employer liability is not viable
here.

97

A few states have used a "dual capacity" theory to hold that an
employer who is covered by the workers' compensation system can be
liable in tort in its capacity as the manufacturer of the machine that
injured the worker. The "dual capacity" theory has seemingly been
rejected in Texas. 98
93.

JOSEPH W. LITTLE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES AND MATERIALS

430

(3d ed. 1993); cf. Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1988) (allowing action by claimant who asserts that carrier has breach its duty of good faith); Massey v.
Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983) (noting viability of claim for carrier's
breach of good faith).

94.

JOSEPH W. LIILE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES AND MATERIALS 443

(3d ed. 1993) (reviewing employer liability); cf Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989) (allowing sex discrimination suit against employer), rev'd on other
grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991); Mitchell v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 722 S.W.2d 522,
524 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that employee's filing and later
compromising federal sex discrimination claim does not preclude seeking state compensation
claim).
95. E.g., Cox v. Glazer Steel Corp., 606 So. 2d 518 (La. 1992).

96. See JOSEPH

W. LITTLE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES AND MATERIALS

444 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing employer liability for tort actions regardless of workers'
compensation).
97. Eg., McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op, 830 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied).
98. See Gina Fulkerson, Note, Workers' Compensation: Dual Capacity in Texas-When
the Employer "Wears Two Hats", 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 473, 473 (1982) (recognizing two Texas
court of appeals rejecting dual capacity theory); Gus Tamborello, Note, The Blood of the
Workman: Allowing a Dual Recovery for an Employee Injured by Its Employer's Defective
Product, 23 Hous. L. REV. 945, 952 (1986) (discussing Texas court of appeals refusal to adopt
dual capacity theory).
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Since 1971 the Texas workers' compensation legislation has made
employers liable for firing or discriminating against workers in retaliation for the workers' having pursued their compensation rights. 99
This provision was retained in the 1989 legislative revision. In a recent court of appeals decisions it yielded one worker a recovery of
$163,500 in actual damages and $900,000 in exemplary damages."
Note that the retaliatory discharge cause of action-like the action for
exemplary damages for gross negligence leading to the death of an
employee 'O-is not subject to the normal exemplary-damage
ceiling.

02

VII.

CONCLUSION

The essentially voluntary nature of the Texas workers' compensation statute results in large numbers of employers choosing not to subscribe to the system.
Consequently, tort actions against
nonsubscribing employers constitute an important area of tort law in
this state.
The two main areas of tort liability of subscribing employers are
fascinating to lawyers but ultimately are probably not very important
to anyone else. Quite properly, lawyers for injured employees and for
the families of deceased employees keep bringing these suits when the
facts warrant such an action, and the reported cases indicate that
sometimes the plaintiff gets past the summary judgment stage. But at
the end of the day it is very difficult to prove gross negligence and
even harder to prove intent. Whether the prospect of liability for intentional injury and for gross negligence in causing a workplace fatality makes any significant contribution to workplace safety in Texas is
unknown. Nor does there seem to be any information available as to
whether the threat of such liability has any discernible effect on the
settlement value of workers' compensation claims.

99. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c
100. Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d
101. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
102. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE

(Vernon Supp. 1993).
826, 830 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).

§ 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
ANN. § 41.002(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993)

(making exemplary damages provisions inapplicable to actions brought under workers' compensation laws).
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